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# Governance and accountability in community policing

Jan Terpstra\*

## *Abstract*

*Community policing presents its own distinct governance and accountability challenges. Local community police officers, for example, can find themselves stretched between the accountability demands of the local community and those flowing from professional, managerial and central government sources. Drawing on the results of a recent ethnographic study on neighbourhood police officers in rural and urban areas in the Netherlands, this article probes the nature and extent of these tensions and the coping strategies deployed by the officers in question and the police organisation as a whole. It finds that a regular strategy is to neutralise or marginalise the voice of the local community in shaping police priorities and strategies. Local democratic control of the police is often smothered by the competing professional, managerial, cultural and central government forces. This, in turn, has the effect of putting distance between police offices and citizens, and even creating a demand for the engagement of private sector patrol officers who are more responsive to the needs and wishes of the local community.*

## **1. Introduction**

Governance and accountability are fundamental issues for the police in democratic societies. On the one hand, the police have the unique power to use coercion if needed. Police work may thus have far-reaching consequences for citizens, for good or ill. In this regard it is important to promote not only the economy and effectiveness of police work, but particularly its fairness, justice and legitimacy, and to monitor the extent to which these goals are attained. On the other hand, the police, both as an organization and at the level of individual officers, have considerable discretion [14]. Moreover, traditional police culture, with its emphasis on internal solidarity and suspicion of the outside world [27], is often assumed to hamper external control. This only serves to accentuate the relevance of issues such as how the police use their autonomy and how one can ensure they deliver important social and legal values. With the loss of traditional command-and-control over police work and the rise of more horizontal forms of governance during recent decades, police governance and accountability have become ever more important.

These issues seem to have special relevance with regard to community policing. Although the meaning of this concept is not always clear [2, 5, 10, 19], a common aim in all forms of community policing is to bridge the distance between the police and citizens, to promote citizen participation, to provide the police with more information and, as a result, to promote the effectiveness of policing strategies [38]. Thanks to developments such as citizen oversight, it is often assumed that community policing also encourages local governance and accountability of the police [15, 29, 30]. A main argument underlying the initiation of the familiar Chicago community policing style, with its emphasis on citizen participation, was that it would enable citizens to provide local knowledge and resources to the police, and that they would be better able to 'monitor police officers and hold them accountable' [7].

However, community policing is not always seen as beneficial to police accountability. From a more hierarchical perspective, organizational decentralization, a growing intimacy between community police officers and citizens, and increased use of discretion by police officers, may be viewed as potential threats to accountability. According to Kelling, Wasserman and Williams [13; p.2] 'advocates of community policing (-) should be extraordinarily scrupulous about ensuring that officers are held accountable for their actions.' This more sceptical view of the accountability of community policing reappears from time to time. According to Brogden and Nijhar [2; pp.53-56] there is 'a major problem of accountability with regard to community policing.' In their view, community policing leads to the police becoming dependent on community participation and community consent. This is seen as a factor that might encourage the police to follow specific interests, which might in turn increase the risk of 'discriminatory law enforcement.' This view of the relation between community policing and accountability is also found in the recent work published by Herbert [9; p.85]. In his view, both cultural and organizational factors make it necessary 'to adopt a sceptical attitude toward community policing as a vehicle for improved police accountability.'

It is in the light of these diverging views that I deal here with the practices of governance and accountability of community policing. My special interest is in the diversity of and relations between various forms of governance and accountability of community policing. This paper is based on several empirical studies of community policing in the Netherlands [31, 32, 34]. Among them is an ethnographic study in which the daily work of community police officers was observed at six different police stations (in both urban and rural areas), for a few weeks at each station [34, 38].

In this paper I first deal with the concepts of police governance and accountability. I then present an overview of police governance/accountability in the Netherlands and community policing in the Netherlands. Thereafter I go on to describe the practices of governance and accountability of community policing in the Netherlands, where I draw a distinction between local and non-local forms of governance and accountability. My conclusions concentrate on the tensions between different forms of governance and accountability and the unintended consequences that may result.

## **2. Police governance and accountability**

It has often been noted that governance and accountability are multifaceted, multi-dimensional concepts [15, 26, 41, 44]. They both refer to the two distinguishable, but interconnected levels of the police organization and the conduct of individual police officers. Different types of governance and accountability may involve a variety of relations and may be based on different channels, methods, means and discourses. In light of this, several distinctions may be drawn between various types of governance and accountability: internal and external, local and centralized, vertical and horizontal, upwards and downwards [30, 44]. Moreover, different types of police governance and accountability may be based on various (combinations of) values, such as the equal treatment of citizens, quality of service, justice, effectiveness and efficiency, democratic legitimacy or (procedural) legality. It may be assumed in general that the shift from government to governance resulted not only in new forms of governance and accountability, but also in more complex, often hybrid combinations, and in this respect the police are no exception. As Chan [3] showed in her study of the Australian police, the new forms of police accountability, based on the New Public Management, often did not replace the older legal and disciplinary forms, despite the

fact that they were based on very different assumptions. In fact, the introduction of managerial and risk management-based forms of accountability resulted in extremely different forms of governance and accountability just piling up, one on the other.

It can be expected that similar processes may have happened among street-level workers, such as community police officers. According to Hupe and Hill [12], changes in the working environment of street-level workers since the 1980s, such as increasing cooperation with partner agencies and closer relations with active citizens, now mean that these workers often operate in 'multidimensional networks', which implies that such officers are not solely oriented along traditional, top-down lines of authority and control. As a result, multiple forms of governance and accountability are to be found in street-level work, including public-administrative, professional and participatory forms. This was confirmed in a recent study by Somerville [30], who showed that community police officers are not only held accountable within the hierarchy, but also horizontally and 'vertically downwards'. Each of these forms involves different actors (superiors, colleagues and the public).

The Cultural Theory of Douglas [6], as applied by Hood [11] to the management of public organizations, may be useful in helping us understand the diversity of governance and accountability and the consequences this may have. Various forms of governance and accountability may be understood as reflecting different underlying cultures: fatalist, hierarchical, individualist and egalitarian (see table 1). These cultures are viewed as fundamental because they cannot be reduced, one to the other. Each culture stresses its own specific values, is based on a certain diagnosis of the police organization and on certain remedies for the prevailing problems. However, each culture of governance/accountability also has its own specific or in-built failures and vulnerabilities.

Table 1. Four cultures of governance and accountability of public organizations; Hood [11]

<p><i>Fatalist</i> Stress on unpredictability; minimal anticipation of future problems, at most ad hoc responses; no trust in goal-oriented policies; let things take their own course is the dominating attitude.</p>	<p><i>Hierarchist</i> Problems are attributed to poor compliance with rules and procedures; remedy is more, strict procedures and rules, better coordination, more control and more 'grip' by the authorities at the top.</p>
<p><i>Individualist</i> Many problems are seen as a result of a surplus of collective organization; solution consists of market-like mechanisms and competition, creating incentives to influence individual behaviour.</p>	<p><i>Egalitarian</i> Too much stress on hierarchical rules and procedures is seen as main cause of problems. Remedy consists of creating more room for 'participation' in decision-making and in co-production of 'equal' members.</p>

This theory may be useful in helping us understand the combination of very diverse forms of governance and accountability in community policing. The four cultures may be seen as reactions to each other. Each culture may be viewed as an endeavour to compensate for the one-sidedness and failures of one or more of the other cultures. The hierarchical, individualist and egalitarian cultures of governance and accountability can be seen as three different ways to find an answer to the more fatalist culture that often dominates traditional police culture at street-level, which promotes a pessimistic view and an unwillingness to steer police work and provide accountability. These cultures may be seen as reactions to each other in other respects, too. Egalitarian culture puts more trust in the participation of lower-level members. It is a reaction to hierarchical cultures, which try to minimize autonomy by strict rules and procedures. Individualist cultures of governance and accountability introduce market-like incentives to bring an end to the red tape and lack of goal-orientation often associated with both hierarchical and egalitarian cultures.

Before analyzing the governance and accountability of community policing in the Netherlands, I must first look at the organization, governance and accountability of the Dutch police, before going on to briefly describe the position of community policing in the country.

### **3. Police governance and accountability in the Netherlands**

The police organization in the Netherlands is traditionally locally based, although national police forces have also existed for quite a long time. Until 1993 all municipalities with more than 25,000 inhabitants had their own police force. In that year, under the new Police Act, the 148 municipal police forces were replaced by 25 (quasi-autonomous) regional police organizations. In addition there is a national police force, which performs specialized tasks. Regional police forces in the Netherlands have a rather complex structure of governance and accountability, partly resulting from the fact that the regional forces have to cooperate with many municipalities (on average about 20), each with its own local government. The Police Act distinguishes between two forms of police governance: the *authority* over the police and the *administration* of the police. Each form of governance relates to different issues and lies within the formal power of different actors.

The *authority* over the police involves the power to make decisions about actual police work, which implies decisions about police priorities, the use of police powers and the exercise of police work in a more general sense. The Police Act distinguishes two forms of authority over the police. In relation to the enforcement of public order (including service tasks), the authority lies with the mayor. The public prosecutor has authority over the police in regard to the enforcement of criminal law. Because the enforcement of public order and criminal law are closely related, there is a need for regular consultation between the actors responsible for them. This is organized in what is called a local triangle, participated in by the mayor, the public prosecutor, and the local police chief.

The *administration* of the police involves the power to make decisions about the force's organization and resources. The 'force administrator', usually the mayor of the largest municipality in the region, has this formal power. There is a need for consultation at the regional level too. In the regional triangle the force administrator frequently meets with the regional public prosecutor and the regional police chief to consult on matters related to the administration of the force. In addition to the authority over and administration of the police, there is a third dimension, namely the *policy* of the police. At the regional level, policy is entrusted to a Regional Board consisting of the regional public prosecutor, the regional police chief and the mayors of all municipalities in the region.

One of the main arguments underlying this complex system of governance and accountability is that it creates checks and balances in the powers over the police, both between the mayor and the public prosecution, and between the local and regional level. In practice, the formal concepts of authority, administration and policy over the police do not offer the full picture. A true understanding of police governance and accountability in practice requires an understanding of the role of informal relations between the main actors. [32].

One of the main problems with the accountability of the Dutch police is the so-called 'democratic deficit'. All the actors involved in the governance and accountability of the regional police, including the mayor, are unelected officials. The elected municipal councils only have the right to be informed by their mayor about decisions made in the Regional Board

and to offer advice about the annual policy plan. In practice this democratic control is rather poor [18, 32]. The distance between the local municipal council and the police (especially at the regional level) is often too great. Members of the council often lack expertise about the police.

In 1993 the new Police Act created a relatively decentralized police structure. Since then, there has been a gradual process of centralization, especially in respect of governance and accountability. In the late 1990s the government introduced a new, centralized procedure for police planning. The new top-down procedure defined national priorities to which the police were expected to conform, both at the local and regional levels. It was a prelude to a more far-reaching system of performance management, introduced in 2003 under the influence of the New Public Management (NPM). This system contains targets and performance indicators which the regional police forces have to achieve. A revised system of performance management was introduced in 2007 [39, 42]. Compared with its predecessor, less emphasis was put on strict, quantitative performance indicators. However, this did not change the gradual centralization of the police. On the contrary, the debate about the replacement of regional forces by a single national police force is still going on. One cannot exclude the possibility that within a couple of years the government will decide that the Netherlands shall have one national police force.

#### **4. Community policing in the Netherlands**

In the Netherlands the first initiatives on community policing were taken in the 1970s, but it was in the early 1990s before community policing became a dominant police model [25]. At that time the institutionalization of community policing was to a large degree a reaction to the increase in scale of police work resulting from the introduction of the new Police Act in 1993. Community policing in the Netherlands, with its stress on decentralization, a focus on small geographical areas and the goal of proximity [40], was a strategy to avoid a growing distance between the police on the one hand and citizens and local government on the other.

At the time of writing all regional police forces in the Netherlands apply the community policing model, in one way or another. The Dutch variant of community policing focuses on five central ambitions: reducing the distance between the police and citizens, an orientation to a broad range of problems in the neighbourhood, an emphasis on preventive as well as reactive policing, cooperation with other agencies, and the encouragement of citizen involvement. A recent study shows that these ambitions have only partially been achieved. Moreover, there are important differences in the organization and implementation of community policing, both between and in regional police forces. In many cases community policing is a relatively isolated job done by individual police officers. In other cases it is the task of a neighbourhood team, some of which undertake crime investigation and/or police patrols, while in other cases they only perform specific 'community policing activities' [34].

The Dutch interpretation of community policing is pragmatic, as illustrated by its adoption of the concept of 'area-bound policing'. In contrast with the United States, for example, where according to Herbert [8; pp.16 and 29-30] community policing is largely based on romanticized notions of community and long-treasured ideals of local democracy, the Netherlands' focus on 'community' or neighbourhood is essentially a functional strategy to reduce the distance between citizens and police. It offers a preferred scale or level at which to

organize a considerable part of the police work in close cooperation with other agencies at that level.

Although community policing is still a dominant paradigm in the Dutch police, support for the model has become more ambivalent during the last decade or so. There seems to be an alternation between support for and criticism of the model, both in and outside the police organization. The erosion of community policing as a dominant mainstream model is the result of several factors, including the new managerial stress on the 'core business' of the police [39] and the shift to a more repressive, punitive policy climate in the Netherlands [20, 21]. According to some commentators this may imply a radical break in the development of community policing in the Netherlands, resulting in the model losing its position. It has even been suggested that the Dutch police, 'with a sigh of relief' can now revert to 'doing "real" police work' [24; p.75].

On the other hand, this assessment is not confirmed by the outcomes of a recent study of community policing in the Netherlands [34, 38]. Admittedly, it shows the new managerialization of the police and changes in the political climate have had an impact on the daily work of community police officers. However, the suggestion that community policing is now defunct and that the police have returned to 'real police work' (whatever that may mean) is difficult to reconcile with the practices of 2635 of community police officers in the Netherlands [17] and the fact that many of the aims of the community policing model are still alive at street-level and form part of the officers' daily work, albeit with many shortcomings and limitations.

## **5. Governance and accountability in community policing: non-local forms**

Governance and accountability in community policing in the Netherlands come in several forms, both local and non-local. Some of the non-local forms originally focused more on the organization as a whole than on individual police officers, but they also impact on the latter [16; pp.172-196]. This complexity results from the fact that a multiplicity of actors have a stake in the implementation of community policing, and the community police officers often are more or less, directly or indirectly, dependent on them. These actors may have different views about the actual and desirable work of community police officers. They may follow different presumptions and values and (in line with this) have different notions about the control and accountability of community policing.

It is useful to distinguish here between two non-local and four local forms of governance and accountability. Bureaucratic and managerial forms are mainly non-local (or perhaps, more accurately, non-locally initiated). In terms of Cultural Theory, they should be considered hierarchical and individualist respectively. The local forms differ with regard to the main actor. They are related to the local government/politics, other police professionals, local partnerships and (groups of) citizens. The first one might be considered hierarchical. The other three are more egalitarian, although they also have elements of other cultures (especially the hierarchical one). How each of these forms of governance and accountability operates is described briefly in the following sections.

### *Bureaucratism*

To outsiders the police organization may look like a strictly organized bureaucracy where the work of officers is precisely regulated with stringent formal or legal rules and control. Although there are differences in the degree to which the police are strictly organized and

controlled, the practice of police work in the Netherlands often differs from its formal perception. This is particularly the case with community policing.

In the view of many senior officers, before 1993 (the year when the new Police Act was introduced and the police were radically reorganized) the traditional organization still dominated, with its strict orders and control. Police officers daily received precise orders from their superiors. Moreover, there were strict forms of scheduling, which largely determined their work activities. This combination of command-and-control and capacity management was embedded in often rather small, easy-to-oversee organizations, dominated by direct personal relations between superiors and officers of lower rank.

The 1993 reorganization introduced a drastic enlargement of the police organization's scale. Many officers were transferred to other positions. As a result many of the direct, personal relations between higher ranks and street-level officers disappeared. The system of command-and-control soon eroded. As a consequence, many police officers noticed that they had more autonomy and were more independent in their work. Many, however, felt as if they were being left to their own devices.

Since the late 1990s the Dutch central government has aimed to reduce the autonomy of the police. Initially the government introduced central policy planning. This approach contained a list of national priorities that the police forces should follow. A complex annual auditing procedure was introduced to check on the forces' achievement of these priorities. Community police officers were also expected to conform to this arrangement. They were to translate the prescribed priorities to the situation in their own neighbourhood. Although community police officers partially conformed (albeit often rather ritualistically), it had relatively little impact on their considerable autonomy. Despite the introduction of all kinds of measures to direct their work (such as neighbourhood scans, neighbourhood safety plans and internal briefings), community police officers work on the ground was still largely shaped by the seemingly endless flow of incidents and issues that confront them on a daily basis in practice, from both within and outside their organization. How community police officers respond to these demands depends mainly on their own view and initiative. Formal rules or orders from higher levels in the organization have hardly any impact.

#### *New managerialism*

Within as little as two years after the introduction of the central planning system, the government decided that it had failed to meet its expectations. An evaluation compared the system and its annual audit procedure to a ritual rain dance [43]. The government therefore decided to introduce a more radical system of performance management. This illustrated the growing influence of NPM discourse and methods within the Dutch police since the mid 1990s [39]. The new system of performance management introduced quantitative targets (with process, output and outcome indicators) that the police forces should attain. If a force did not meet its targets, this could mean it would not receive a (limited) financial bonus [42]. However, the loss of reputation, both of the force and its management, was probably felt to be a more serious sanction.

A detailed study of the daily implementation of community policing [34, 38] showed that this new system of governance and accountability had more impact on police work, although not always in the ways intended. Many of the police forces had translated the system internally into individual targets for police officers. The target of an annually fixed number of required fines proved to be a particularly contentious issue. Community police officers differ in their



views about the system. Some of them think that it has only a limited impact on their own work. These officers are not really concerned about the consequences of the system. Some of them even evaluate it positively – not for themselves, but because of the impact it may have on some of their colleagues who in their view fail to meet their targets due to a lack of commitment. However, even community police officers with a modestly positive view of the system have expressed the fear that the government would raise their production targets over time, which in their view would present negative consequences for their work.<sup>1</sup>

Overall, the majority of the community police officers proved to be rather critical of the performance management system. In their view a fixed target of fines does not fit in with how community policing should operate. They felt they were forced to use strategies and means that they felt were not always appropriate. In their view the introduction of this system showed that the government and the police managers actually did not understand the kind of work they were doing.

The observational study of community police officers also revealed that the performance management system could have some unintended, negative effects on police work.

One of the neighbourhood teams that was studied runs the risk of not realizing its targets of a fixed number of fines for environmental offences. With still a couple of weeks to go until the end of the year, the team management decided that the team members (among them the community police officers) had to produce artificially (more) 'environmental fines.' All citizens who were fishing near one of the ponds or ditches in the neighbourhood would systematically be controlled by the police. Those who did not have a fishing permission with them would get a fine. These fines were (re)defined as fines for environmental delinquency in order to realize the production target. Members of the neighbourhood team conformed to this strategy, but were offstage highly cynical about it.

This (together with several other examples) shows that performance management became to a significant extent an end in itself. This is all the more paradoxical because the system, derived from the private business sector, was meant to promote goal-orientation, effectiveness and efficiency in public sectors like the police [4, 22]. In 2007, after much discussion and a lot of criticism, the government decided to revise the system to base it less one-sidedly on quantitative targets and performance indicators. However, the underlying logic remained unchanged. Moreover, despite the change in government policy, many police forces internally retained the system of fixed production targets and strict control of lower-rank officers.

## **6. Governance and accountability of community policing: local forms**

In addition to non-locally initiated forms of police governance and accountability there are also several local forms which are of particular relevance to community policing. These form part of the relations between the police and local government, partner agencies and citizens. The latter two are relatively new and relate to important changes in public security over approximately the past 15 years and the changing position of the police in an increasingly 'multilateralized' field [1].

### *Local administrative and political governance/accountability*

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<sup>1</sup>As mentioned before: the government did not raise these standards. The system of performance management was revised in 2007. More emphasis was put on qualitative rather than quantitative standards.

Three elements of local government are relevant to police governance and accountability: the position of the mayor as the official with (partial) authority over the police; the position of the municipal council; and the new position of local government in the so-called local integrated public safety policy.

First, the mayor has the legal authority to decide on local police priorities and general strategies in regard to the enforcement of public order. However, the relationship between the mayor and the local police is often more complex than this might suggest. Although public order authority formally vests with the mayor, in practice he or she is dependent on other, non-local officials who have authority over criminal law enforcement and police administration. This implies that, while the mayor may decide on certain police priorities, he or she does not have the power to decide on the police personnel and resources that may be needed.<sup>2</sup>

There may be another complicating factor in small and medium-sized municipalities. Although the local police chief is accountable to the mayor in respect of public order enforcement, in practice this may conflict with the need to manage internal relations with his or her police bosses, who work elsewhere in the region. At a higher level within the police organization there may be other priorities than those set by the mayor. As a result, a local police chief (in small municipalities a community police officer) is often caught between at least two stools: the mayor, and his or her own, internal police superior. One of the strategies that local police officers (chiefs or community police officers) use in response, is to avoid strict accountability to the mayor.

Another strategy is to keep relations with the mayor very informal [32]. Since the mayor (or the municipality in general) often depends on the police's expertise, information and resources, he or she will often find it difficult to govern and control the police. Mayors often feel they are dependent on community police officers for information about social tensions, social disorder and (potential) social and political unrest within their community. Accordingly, some of them, especially those in medium-sized municipalities, will want to have regular, direct relations with 'their' community police officers. This may entail regular meetings (bi-monthly, for example). In this informal way they get more information and are better able to steer the police work in the neighbourhoods. Using this strategy means they bypass the obstacles in the formal, hierarchical line, with its many layers and interests.

The second element concerns the democratic influence on and control of the local police. In the Netherlands the elected municipal council has very few powers over the police. The council only has a right to request the mayor for information about decisions made in the Regional Board, which they are allowed to discuss. For members of a municipal council it may be difficult to participate in debates on the police and to influence the police agenda because they often lack the necessary information and expertise. Moreover, the municipal council has no influence on matters of *authority* or *administration* over the police. It is left to the willingness of the mayor to follow any advice offered by council members. In the Netherlands the police have no formal obligation of accountability to the elected municipal council. Nevertheless, local police chiefs often attend meetings of the council or one of its committees. Even if there is no formal demand of accountability, police chiefs think it is important to have good relations with local politicians. This does not detract from the fact

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<sup>2</sup> With the exception of the mayor of large municipalities, who may have authority over the local police and can be the regional police force administrator.

that, both formally and in practice, the municipal councils do not have a genuine influence on the local police and are barely able to exercise any democratic control on the police [18].

Thirdly, the rise of the integrated public safety policy in the Netherlands over the past 15 years has had enormous consequences for the position of local government. Until the mid-1980s issues of crime and disorder were virtually absent from the local government agenda. Today, local government has a central position in local security policies and arrangements. There is a general consensus that local government should coordinate local security. This implies that officials working in many sectors and departments of the local administration participate in a very wide range of local initiatives and local security networks [36]. This also has consequences for the relations between local government and the local police. Here they are partner agencies, cooperating in a more or less horizontal relationship. The coordination of these networks by local government is a form of governance among 'equals', often depending on negotiations, the power of persuasion and a search for consensus. These complex, informal networks often lack transparency and accountability, both externally and internally [36].

#### *Professional governance/accountability*

Although community police officers work in a given organizational context, under different forms of governance and control, and have to cooperate with several groups of actors trying to influence their work, they still have considerable autonomy. The priorities in their work, the issues they pay attention to and their work style result largely from their own decisions (even though these are not always made reflexively). Community police officers have what Prottas [23] calls a 'boundary-spanning role', which means that, although they are members of the police organization, they often operate on their own outside the police station, have their own agenda, maintain contacts with citizens and agencies that no colleague is aware of, work for the most part without direct supervision and have a surplus of information about relevant situations and problems in the neighborhood. This makes it difficult for their superiors to control them.

For community police officers, the considerable autonomy they have is one of the most attractive elements of their job. It gives them the room to do their work in a way they prefer, to take their own responsibility and to show their commitment and ability in finding solutions to problematic situations in their neighbourhood. This also implies that they expect that their superiors leave them some autonomy. It does not follow, however, that they do not welcome some levels of input from their superior officers. Although community police officers attach great value to their autonomy, they still expect their superiors to support them in their work, to operate as a source of information and to help them in case of trouble, especially if emotional distress is involved. They expect a form of guidance when they are faced with complex tasks. These forms of support and guidance (one might also call it coaching) are not hierarchical, but are delivered by one professional to another (even if the other professional is their superior). These forms of support presuppose and value the autonomy of the community police officer.

In the view of many community police officers in the Netherlands there is a lack of professional support in their work. This is one of the factors contributing to tensions in the relations between community police officers and higher ranking officers, including their direct chief. In the past, professional forms of police governance and accountability were presented as potential alternatives to a command-and-control culture in police organizations. It is a form of self-regulation by professionals based on self-imposed rules, values and procedures [13]. However, this ideal of a professional police culture of governance and

accountability is seldom realized in practice. One of the consequences is that no professional police tradition was available to provide an adequate response to the new managerial discourse and instruments that have come to dominate the Dutch police for more than a decade. The main thrust of the new managerial discourse is to impose limitations on the autonomy and power of professionals in the public sector. In this atmosphere, and with a poor professional tradition within the police, professional governance and accountability remain marginal.

#### *Governance and accountability in partnerships*

Since the 1990s the Dutch police have increasingly been participating in all kinds of local security networks. These networks provide more or less holistic strategies for controlling problems of crime and disorder, such as those in neighbourhoods, shopping malls, business parks, public transport or recreational areas. The participants in such networks include the police, local government (often represented by various departments), organizations for welfare, youth work, social services, schools, business associations and citizens. In these networks the police are often represented by a community police officer [33, 34].

The participation of the police in these networks may have consequences for police governance and accountability, especially for community policing. In these networks partners make agreements about common procedures, the exchange of information and the coordination of activities. Although there may be formal agreements (even contracts) between partner agencies, in practice such networks often depend on informal agreements and personal relations.

In many networks, local government (or one of its departments) is expected to be the coordinator and to control whether partner agencies are conforming to the agreements made. In practice, coordination by local governments is often rather poor. Many factors contribute to this, such as a lack of resources, a shortage of expertise and a culture that is often more focused on policy processes than the practical work done in these networks. This is one of the reasons why the police (especially the community police officer) with its surplus of information and expertise, often gradually take over this coordination task. Moreover, these forms of governance and accountability are difficult to implement because relations between the members of these networks are horizontal and more or less egalitarian. There are no hierarchical relations even between the coordinator (local government) and the network's members, which means that governance is not a matter of command but, even in case of formal agreements, a question of negotiation, persuasion and consultation – processes which often take time. It is often hard to say whether they are effective in influencing the police. Roughly the same applies to the control of the activities of the network participants. Not only are the members independent and their participation often voluntary; there may also be organizational interests dissuading members from providing information about their performance. Accountability of the police in such a network is therefore often voluntary and limited. If one of the participating organizations (including the police) does not want to offer accountability for its work, the other participants may be dissatisfied but may not be able to force the matter.

Community police officers who are willing to cooperate with other agencies, ready to adapt their activities to those of their partners and to be open about their work, may be constrained by a dependency on their superiors, who often differ in their view of the participation of the police in the network. They may have their reservations about participation in such networks, fearing it will produce a greater workload for the police and perhaps divert them from their

'core business' tasks. The result is that community police officers may be in a conflicted position between external partners and internal superiors. Although local security networks contribute to policing and public security, they have only a limited impact on police governance and accountability.

#### *Local participatory governance and accountability*

A central aim of community policing is to promote citizen involvement in the management of crime and disorder in the neighbourhood. One of the strategies to achieve this is by citizen participation in deliberations with the police. A well-known example of this is the beat meetings in Chicago. Such deliberations may be used to present citizens' views on problems in the neighbourhood, as well as their priorities for police work. The meetings may also be used to promote police accountability directly to citizens [7, 29].

Local forms of direct and participatory police governance and accountability are often presented as alternatives to hierarchical and professional forms that, albeit in different ways, tend to exclude citizens from direct inspection and control of the police [14, 26]. Local forms of police governance and accountability may also be seen as correctives to the creeping centralization of the Dutch police, partly a result of the dominance of NPM-based policies, such as performance management.

Many of the community police officers in the Netherlands have regular meetings with residents. The functions, structure and frequency of these meetings may differ. As a rule, community police officers have rather negative views about such meetings, believing that such deliberations are not 'productive'. Moreover, citizens who attend the meetings are seen as unrepresentative of the whole community, often being viewed as 'loudmouths', more interested in their own interests or 'making trouble'. Citizens attending these meetings are often described as having 'unrealistic' demands and as 'chronic complainers' [28, 37]. As a result, many community police officers perceive these meetings as a boring and irritating task.

During these meetings community police officers have to deal with two potential tensions. First, they may be confronted with demands by citizens that the police are not able or ready to meet. On the one hand they should not commit themselves too readily to these demands. On the other, they should avoid citizens feeling insulted by their refusal. Community police officers use several strategies to achieve this: by explaining the 'difficult position' of the police, minimizing the seriousness of the problems, redefining citizens' demands (so that it is no longer seen as a police task) or by referring citizens to another agency. None of these strategies is without risk: citizens may perceive this as an indication that the police are not really interested in their problems or that they are more motivated by police self-interest.

Secondly, during these meetings community police officers are often confronted with all kinds of citizen discomfort and uneasiness. In many cases these feelings do not relate to police issues in the narrow sense, but more to general economic or social conditions about which the citizens feel uneasy (such as radical changes in the neighbourhood population). Nevertheless, this discomfort is often focused on the police. As a result community police officers feel that they become scapegoats for problems that have nothing to do with them.

Despite these drawbacks, most community police officers carry on attending these meetings. Partly this is thanks to their loyalty and sense of duty. Even more important is that such meetings provide them with information about (new) problems and risks in the neighbourhood. In fact, community police officers often imperceptibly redefine the main

function of these meetings with citizens, going from a deliberation about police priorities and control to a one-sided, police-centered provision of information. This may also explain the irritation about the meetings, both among police officers and citizens. Often without their being aware of it, police officers and citizens may have divergent expectations about the meetings: as only a source of information or as a 'real' say in police matters. Whereas deliberating citizens may be viewed by police officers as 'soreheads' or 'troublemakers', community police officers may be perceived by citizens as unresponsive. The two complaints are complementary.

This analysis shows that in practice local and direct forms of police governance and accountability are scarcely ever realized. This corresponds with the conclusions of Herbert [9] in his study conducted in Seattle. However, in contrast to his conclusions, the present study shows that the poor level of local governance and accountability is not the result of a police culture that emphasizes police self-protection. The neutralization of citizen input and control may better be seen as the outcome of police officers' strategies to reconcile conflicting demands and expectations from citizens and from their organization. The result is a minimization of influence and control of citizens on the police.

## **7. Concluding remarks**

For the past 15 years or so the forms of governance and accountability of community policing have been multiplying. New forms were introduced, often as a result of the eroding legitimacy and power of older ones and because new actors succeeded in getting their views and interests on the police agenda. However, these new models did not replace the old ones; rather they were 'grafted on top of it' [3; p.262]. It is often assumed that hybrid public organizations require hybrid forms of accountability (and, one may add, governance). This analysis certainly makes sense. Various forms of governance and accountability, based on different cultures, have their own logic, but also their specific failures. Failures may be compensated by changing the permutations. However, this still leaves open the question of how the various types of governance and accountability relate [26].

Piling up different forms of governance and accountability, each with different underlying assumptions and logics, creates a complexity that is difficult to see through. Moreover, as the preceding analysis has shown, hardly any of these forms of governance/accountability of community policing in the Netherlands meets its standards. The traditional culture of command-and-control is hard to align with the complexity of community policing, the need for a flexible, tailor-made approach and the need for officer discretion. The new managerial forms of governance and accountability (particularly performance management) do not fit with the localized nature of this work. This creates unintended consequences that are difficult to combine with community policing, such as creeping centralization and standardization. This conclusion also applies to local forms of governance and accountability. In the Netherlands, governance and control of the police by local government and the elected municipal council are both rather poor, as a result of various factors, like the tension between regional and local interests, the complexity of the formal governance structure of the police and the shortage of formal powers and expertise of members of the municipal council. Professional forms of governance and accountability are often presented as a solution to the failures associated with hierarchical and individualist governance/accountability. However, these professional forms are barely implemented in practice, despite the fact that this is what many community police officers would prefer and expect.

For the past 15 years, there has been a growing interest in citizen participation with regard to policing and public safety. The foregoing analysis has shown that citizen participation scarcely contributes to local participatory forms of police governance/accountability. Influence and control of the police by partners and citizens may be perceived as conflicting with the views, routines and priorities of the police themselves. The failure of local participatory forms of police governance and accountability in the Netherlands seems to correspond with experience in the United States, where Herbert [8] analyzed this failure as a consequence of lofty and unrealistic expectations about 'community' and local democracy. However, similar results were found in the Netherlands, even with its much more modest and pragmatic expectations about the meaning of the word 'community' in community policing and the relation between community policing and local democracy.

The complexity of the governance and accountability of community policing is a more pressing issue due to the conflicting underlying cultures. Hierarchical cultures demand more rules, procedures, control and a unitary form of command. Individual and egalitarian forms expect more benefit from combinations of low-level democratic control, professional self-regulation and police officer discretion. The relations between the different forms of governance and accountability are often unclear. In many respects they counteract each other. There are at least two responses to this complexity and lack of clarity, which exist side by side. First, the way the problems and tensions resulting from the multiple nature of police governance/accountability are handled is to a large degree left to the discretion of individual community police officers. The extent of citizen input and control depends very much on the ways individual officers manage the resulting tensions. Secondly, in many respects the traditional, central forms of governance and accountability have greater weight than the recently developed local ones. This results in part from the fact that the resources on which local police officers depend are more related to bureaucratic and managerial forms of governance and accountability. Moreover, the local forms are often quite informal, depending on personal commitment and the initiatives of individual police officers. This is often a poor basis for local governance and accountability in community policing.

The imbalance between non-local and local governance/accountability has far-reaching consequences. Local democratic control of the police, both by the elected municipal council and by more informal, direct deliberative forms, often operates inadequately. Local governments, especially of small or medium-sized municipalities, often find that they are unable to exert much influence on the police. They notice that a higher level decides that the police should pay less attention to the problems in their communities. To compensate for this, an increasing number of local governments have established their own forms of municipal police, financed by their own resources and with fewer formal powers. The lack of local police governance and accountability also means that affluent local citizens are increasingly starting up their own forms of private security, such as residential patrols, for example [35]. In summary, in contrast to the original intentions of community policing, the imbalance between local and non-local forms of police governance/accountability seems to result in a growing distance between the police and local government, municipal council and citizens.

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